I consider it a measure of my humanity to be written off
by the living graves of a billion murdered lives.
-"Nailing Descartes To The Wall(Liquid) Meat Is Still Murder" by Propaghandi
J. Neil Schulman writes in “The Illogic of Animal Rights” and in his follow-up article “Fifty Things Animals Can’t Do” why he thinks that animal rights activists “don't love animals. They hate men.”
First he points out that either humans are like other animals or we are not. If we are, then we have no moral obligations. If we are not, then we are superior and therefore the only ones morally relevant.
There is no virtue to this argument. We are like other animals in many ways, but different in many ways (just like any species). We are the only species that seems to make moral judgements on the magnitude that we do. This in no way means we are the only ones that are morally relevant – it just means we are the only ones who know better. This is a difference between us and other animals, but no reason has been given for why this difference is the only criterion upon which moral relevance depends.
His other argument is that animals are inferior to humans and therefore have no rights.
His argument for why animals are inferior to humans is that animals are unable to do many things humans can which exhibit our intelligence and self-consciousness.
Schulman gives, in his second article, a list of fifty things animals can’t do (including things like “the practice of law”). He then concludes “For those of you who can't understand the argument any other way, because these other species don't have the innate ability to engage in any of these activities, all other species of animals known to mankind are inferior to us and don't have rights.”
There are some very large and very obvious problems with this argument:
First, why draw the line at the level of species? Non-human species are unable to do x and therefore they are inferior. Why not say non-mammal? Arguably because the human species encapsulates all of the “superior” beings, so there is no need to cast a larger net. But we can narrow our net, as non-infant humans without any disabilities are really the only ones capable of doing the things on his list. Therefore, infants and people with disabilities don’t have any rights. Anything Schulman has said about animals goes for them, and therefore, following his argument to its conclusion, there is no such thing as human rights – only rights for the capable.
Secondly, why the list he offers? He offers a short list of things in his first article which he claims as proof of intelligence and self-consciousness. The list includes things like “Being observed as producing or having produced technological artifacts unique to that species” (let’s ignore chimps do this). Why does he set the bar where he does? Why not set it differently, as animals do show considerable intelligence in many different intelligence tests (pigs, for example, are as intelligent as small children, and chimps beat humans are certain aspects of intelligence tests)? Some animals have demonstrated self-consciousness when being set in front of a mirror, so why is this not a criterion? Why not set the bar lower, so that smaller tasks that show intelligence count? Why not set the bar higher, so that only extremely intelligent humans meet the standard? The criteria used are entirely arbitrary and extremely biased.
Third, how does it follow from listing a bunch of things that animals can’t do that we are superior? I can list many things different animals can do that we can’t, but I wouldn’t claim they are superior to us. Schulman takes an extremely anthropomorphic measure of “superiority”. Humans are, on average, much more intelligent than other animals. If this is the standard he is using, fine, but why not just come out and say “humans are smarter than animals, therefore animals don’t have rights”? At least then I could accept the premise.
Finally, even if we did have an objective measure of superiority, how would it follow that whatever species is inferior to humans is completely lacking any rights? This seems like the old “might makes right” adage. No reason has been given to think that the “inferior” are less morally important than the superior, let alone not morally significant at all. If intelligence or ability to do things is our measure of superiority, then I am certainly superior to many humans – since they are inferior to me, does it follow that they don’t have rights? There is no reason to attach moral importance to the species one belongs to, so I don’t know why – even if humans on average were “superior” – it would follow that all humans are protected by rights while all non-human animals are not. Even if it did follow that humans are more morally significant than other animals, it does not follow that animals are not morally significant at all.
Perhaps the most disturbing part of Schulman’s message is that he thinks animal rights activists “don't love animals. They hate men.” He quote mines up something by one animal rights activist saying that "Human suffering resulting from drought and famine in Ethiopia is tragic, yes, but the destruction there of other creatures and habitat is even more tragic", exaggerates it and generalizes it to all animal rights activists. As an animal rights activist AND a human rights activist, I am appalled. It’s such a ludicrous point I feel silly just addressing it, but every animal rights activist I have ever met are counter-examples to this claim. Most are quite conscious of the fact that a vegan diet helps humans, as meat production is horrible for the environment (which in turn affects humans) and factory farms are notoriously bad for workers’ rights. I can counter with the (hopefully equally false) claim “Schulman doesn’t love humans. He hates animal rights activists”.
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24 comments:
screw animals- they do not have soul like humans and thus do not deserve the rights we do.
anonymous,
I have to add: Screw blacks - they do not have a soul like whites and thus do not deserve the rights we do.
(In other words, untestable assertions about souls hold no weight in any ethical argument, and I don't know why something not having a soul would make it unworthy of rights. I don't believe anything has a soul, but I still believe in human rights)
Yes, I realize that comment was probably a joke, but I had to respond =P
Tommy:
Greetings, this is Ron, fellow supporter of CFI and FAC. Just writing to see if you can help me promote my funniest scripture quote contest on your blog. Here's the link: http://theframeproblem.wordpress.com/2008/03/09/the-religious-humor-contest-whats-the-funniest-piece-of-scripture-youve-ever-read/
Would be much appreciated.
PS: Your blog name is among the wittier that I've come across. Well done, sir.
What is this shit? Here's a thought: animals don't have rights because I say they don't have rights. I'm not being facetious. Who decides what organisms have rights? I'll tell you who: precisely that organism (or those organisms) which wields the most "power." Power here is being defined as the ability to "decide what happens" in reality. That is to say, if I feel like skinning a kitten alive, then either that kitten can stop me, or it can die. This argument is totally general; let's not get hung up on the kitten. If I feel that it's right to kill a human, but they feel that I'm wrong, who decides what happens? Well, the one of us with, say, a gun.
Anonymous:
First of all, this post was rebutting a fallacious argument against animal rights, not advancing an argument for animal rights, so your "What is this shit?" was quite unnecessary. You have just introduced a new argument for animal rights which was outside the scope of this post. Here is my response:
Most people have a little thing called a conscience. This is the thing that makes you feel bad when you hurt others, or cringe when you hear about the holocaust.
If you have no conscience, I can't give you any reason for being moral. Some people simply don't have a conscience - we call these people psychopaths. If you're willing to go that route, to admit you are completely devoid of any moral bearings, I certainly can't argue you away from it. From the sounds of it, you would be for slavery, for genocide, for torture, if it suited your interests.
The fact that one person has a weapon doesn't make them morally right. Rights are a way of codifying the things moral people think others should have access to. The fact that the Nazis had power in Germany doesn't mean that the Jews didn't deserve human rights.
If you have a conscience, you have to think about the things that feel bad to you. You probably don't like knowing you are causing unnecessary suffering. If you're willing to admit that, then in the interest of being consistent, you would need to admit animals are morally relevant.
You have said that (if I have no conscience) you can't give me any reason to be moral. What you should have said is that (regardless of the state of my conscience) you can't give me any reason to agree with your particular morals. Morals are not something universal that everyone shares; their homogeneity is not an objective fact of reality.
You also say that someone wielding a weapon does not make them morally right. I agree with you; that's not the argument I'm putting forth. I'm saying that someone having a weapon renders someone who doesn't have a weapon's morals superfluous: That which manifests is that which the weapon-holder chooses.
You bring up the rather interesting example of the holocaust and Nazi Germany several times (Godwin's law?). Hitler felt that it was right to eradicate Jews - the Jews did not share this sentiment. So who won in this clash of morals? Well, Hitler obviously did temporarily. However, the majority of the Allies disagreed with Hitler's particular notion of "right". Thus, there was a power struggle, and the more powerful party asserted their morality upon reality - part of which entailed liberation of the Jews.
I actually don't mind if I cause unnecessary suffering in the least bit. If we were to specialize the statement a little more to relate specifically to my loved ones, then I would agree; but the statement as it stands is far too general.
And yes, I certainly could imagine situations in which I supported slavery, genocide, torture etc. In all seriousness, I would like to have a slave right now; it would be extremely convenient.
Presumably, you are opposed to slavery. Why?
“Morals are not something universal that everyone shares; their homogeneity is not an objective fact of reality.”
Of course they aren’t. But as a species, we share a hell of a lot of our sense of morality. While some of it is certainly culturally based (i.e. someone claiming that smoking marijuana is morally wrong), much of it rests on our innate ability to empathize. People generally feel bad knowing they are causing pain to someone else because they can empathize with that pain. If you don’t feel this, fine, like I said, I can’t say anything to you to make you rationally accept that causing pain and suffering to others is wrong – but I think it is very obvious that you are an anomaly.
“I'm saying that someone having a weapon renders someone who doesn't have a weapon's morals superfluous: That which manifests is that which the weapon-holder chooses.”
So this has absolutely nothing to do with morality, and I don’t see why you brought it up in the first place.
“You bring up the rather interesting example of the holocaust and Nazi Germany several times (Godwin's law?). Hitler felt that it was right to eradicate Jews - the Jews did not share this sentiment. So who won in this clash of morals? Well, Hitler obviously did temporarily. However, the majority of the Allies disagreed with Hitler's particular notion of "right". Thus, there was a power struggle, and the more powerful party asserted their morality upon reality - part of which entailed liberation of the Jews.”
The vast majority of the Nazis, when forced to see exactly what their policies had led to, were horrified. It wasn’t that their morality was in power – it was a much more complex socio-psychological phenomenon going on, but needless to say, they did not morally agree with the policies put in place. Assuming that Hitler would have been fine with these policies if he was faced with the suffering he was causing (I don’t know much about Hitler himself so I don’t know if this was the case) just says that he was an aberration from the norm – it doesn’t mean we can’t talk about morality.
“I actually don't mind if I cause unnecessary suffering in the least bit. If we were to specialize the statement a little more to relate specifically to my loved ones, then I would agree; but the statement as it stands is far too general.
And yes, I certainly could imagine situations in which I supported slavery, genocide, torture etc. In all seriousness, I would like to have a slave right now; it would be extremely convenient.”
Most people would, when forced to admit that their argument leads to this, take it as a reduction ad absurdum. The fact that you don’t have a problem with these things is about as relevant as saying that since one person likes the taste of coal, we can’t talk about what makes things taste good. This would mean that the culinary arts are really just nonsense, there is no point talking about master chefs since taste is subjective, etc. The fact is, we all have fundamentally similar physiologies of taste. There are certainly many differences in people’s tastes, but the vast majority of people can say that a piece of coal does not make a good meal, and we can talk about the sorts of things that make a meal taste good. The analogy isn’t very strong, but hopefully that gives you an idea of why it makes sense to talk about rights and morality.
“Presumably, you are opposed to slavery. Why?”
Well, taking from what I’ve said so far, I can empathize with a slave. I know having my freedom taken away would suck, and so I would feel extremely bad about taking away the freedom of someone else. Also, more pragmatically, I would be frightened that if the legal system allowed the enslavement of some people, I might be next. This is where giving all humans inalienable rights comes in handy, and why even if I was acting completely selfishly I might still be inclined to fight for the rights of other people and minorities.
You said: "So this has absolutely nothing to do with morality, and I don’t see why you brought it up in the first place."
It most certainly does have something to do with morality - it describes the "place," if you like, of morality. Morality is subordinate to power. That is why I brought it up.
You said: "The fact that you don’t have a problem with these things is about as relevant as saying that since one person likes the taste of coal, we can’t talk about what makes things taste good."
Now let's just hold on a minute, good sir. The fact that I don't have a problem with these things is completely relevant if we're talking about my particular moral compass...which we were.
I am by no means attempting to map my morality onto society, but if we're talking about my particular views, then I will present my particular views.
I've never claimed we "can't talk about morality." Indeed, that claim would be demonstrably fallacious, as we are currently engaged in an exchange regarding said subject. You've devoted considerable effort to this point, and I'm not entirely sure why; I believed it to be rather patent that we were talking about our personal views.
My views on the supremacy of power over morality are completely general - my particular morals, however, are obviously not. If one uses power in a different way than I would, it does not falsify my argument, it simply reflects the fact that humanity's morality is inhomogeneous. The fact remains that "right" and "wrong" are subjective, and the working definition of said terms is laid out by that party which possesses the most power.
If you would like to speak more generally, e.g. about why I feel that the intersection of much of society's morals permits mistreatment of animals, then I would certainly be willing to widen our scope.
I think that many members of society find the ascription of rights to animals absurd, and rightly so. Of course, my argument would be one from power over morality. Society, however, may make a slightly different case.
Let's consider, for example, what happens when you walk around each day. You are inflicting a literal holocaust upon microbial life. Does this upset you? It should if it upsets you to kill a mouse. Indeed, it should upset you a great deal. The fact is that our species is in a unique position on this planet. We alone are the single most powerful organisms, and we act as such. We draw a distinction between humans and animals simply because there is one to draw.
What sort of rights would you like to give animals? Rights and responsibilities are inextricably linked. For example, we have a special judiciary system for minors; this is a reflection of the fact that minors have less responsibility in our society. If someone throws a rock through your window, do you take the rock to court? Is the rock responsible? What if a wild dog jumps through your window? Do you take the dog to court? It is absurd to give a rock rights, because the rock has no responsibility, the rock can't understand what having a right even means. This is easily extended to animals. Do you propose we instate some sort of generalized judiciary system wherein a squirrel can sue a beetle for biting one of its youngsters?
The fact remains that "right" and "wrong" are subjective, and the working definition of said terms is laid out by that party which possesses the most power.
As I have argued, “right” and “wrong” may be subjective to a point, but to take that to the extreme – that any definition of “right” and “wrong” is as good as any other – is what I am arguing against. The working definition of these terms is laid out by whoever is using the terms – the government might tell me torture is okay, but I don’t have to agree, even at gunpoint. Morality is different from legality.
I think that many members of society find the ascription of rights to animals absurd, and rightly so. Of course, my argument would be one from power over morality.
Could you outline the argument you would use? I still do not see how this talk of power has anything to do with morality. Morality is a motivator – we are motivated to do certain actions because they are moral, or to not do certain actions because they are immoral. Power is just what gives us the means to perform these actions.
Let's consider, for example, what happens when you walk around each day. You are inflicting a literal holocaust upon microbial life. Does this upset you? It should if it upsets you to kill a mouse. Indeed, it should upset you a great deal.
It should upset me a great deal? Why? You give me no reason why I can’t draw a distinction between a mouse and microbial life. Microbial life has no central nervous system. They can’t feel any pain, they aren’t anymore conscious than a rock, and they have no mental representations. Mice have quite developed central nervous systems, are capable of feeling pain (similar parts of their brain “light up” when they are hurt as ours, and when given pain killers they are more tolerant of painful activities), and have at least some sort of consciousness. A mouse certainly isn’t as morally significant as a human, but this doesn’t mean they are no more than microbial life.
The fact is that our species is in a unique position on this planet. We alone are the single most powerful organisms, and we act as such. We draw a distinction between humans and animals simply because there is one to draw.
Can you please spell out this distinction that can be drawn between humans and animals, while keeping the discussion secular? If we can draw a distinction between ourselves and animals, what about our evolutionary ancestors? How far can we travel back up out evolutionary history before we can find a being that is no longer morally significant, and how can we draw this line so it isn’t arbitrary? What distinguishes a mentally disabled human being from an animal? Why does just belonging to the human species hold moral weight?
What sort of rights would you like to give animals?
The right to be free from abuses (i.e. freedom from the sort of torture they go through in factory farms would be a good start)
Rights and responsibilities are inextricably linked.
How so? Certainly you can have rights without responsibilities, if you are trying to imply we can’t. Humans have human rights regardless of their responsibilities – an infant with no responsibilities still has rights.
You said: Could you outline the argument you would use? I still do not see how this talk of power has anything to do with morality."
Here's the argument, though it's already been essentially stated several times:
I can do whatever I want to an animal because I have more power; i.e. the animal cannot stop me. Therefore if I want to do X to an animal, I will. That is, unless you happen to feel that doing X to an animal is wrong and have more power than I do.
Now personally, I don't give a shit about humans (in general) or animals. That is where my personal moral compass enters the picture. For example, when I am eating delicious cheese burgers, I could not care less if the cow endured horrible torture before arriving on my my plate. You, however, will use your power over animals in a different manner - one that refelcts your morals.
I'm not sure how the connection to morality can be made any more apparent. Power decides whose morality is allowed to have a say in matters. Your confusion, to me, is roughly equivalent to saying you don't understand the connection between a referee and a hockey game (an admittedly loose analogy, but you get the idea).
I segued into the argument about a distinction between humans and animals by saying it was a possible case society might make against you. Do I agree with it? No; I simply agree with the conclusion - though I arrived at it by different means.
That said, your response was rather amusing. You said that a mouse has at least "some sort of consciousness." I would enjoy some elucidation, but first I'd like you to define consciousness, please...!
I'm exceedingly curious as to where you draw the line between human and mouse. Your rebuttal to my hypothetical societal argument was that we can travel along the evolutionary tree, so that any distinction we may draw is essentially arbitrary. So from whence comes the surplus of moral significance?
You said: "How so?" in regards to my statements about rights and responsibilities being intertwined. Well, I'll again play devil's advocate here:
Rights are meaningless without responsibility. Why does an animal deserve the right to not be injured? Rights are something that must be deserved. An animal cannot understand the concept of a right. It has no responsibility; it cannot be held accountable for violating the rights of others. If we give an animal the right not to be injured, how do we react if the animal injures someone? What about if one animal injures another? Humans are held accountable for violating the rights of others, because humans are given responsibility; we understand what a right is. Giving an animal a right is no different from giving a rock a right: neither can understand what a right is. This understanding is precisely what makes the right meaningful - it is the responsibility required of something before we can grant it a right.
Your position is quite typical of the vegans I've had talks with. You're convinced that animal rights is some sort of noble cause. It simply isn't.
I can do whatever I want to an animal because I have more power; i.e. the animal cannot stop me. Therefore if I want to do X to an animal, I will. That is, unless you happen to feel that doing X to an animal is wrong and have more power than I do.
I’m not sure I understand. Are you saying “What I have the ability to do is morally acceptable, I have the ability to do X, and therefore X is morally acceptable”? In that case you are committing the naturalistic fallacy. Are you saying “I have the power to do X, I find nothing morally wrong with X, therefore it is morally acceptable”? In that case you are taking the extreme form of moral relativism, which I have already argued against.
I'm not sure how the connection to morality can be made any more apparent. Power decides whose morality is allowed to have a say in matters.
The opinion of the powerful is not necessarily correct, so this point is moot.
You said that a mouse has at least "some sort of consciousness." I would enjoy some elucidation, but first I'd like you to define consciousness, please...!
A rough definition of some different levels of consciousness (in the context we are talking about):
1. The ability to have experiences
2. Self-awareness
3. Awareness that the self is having an experience
Studies of consciousness are still very much in the dark, as we are still without an adequate theory of consciousness. However, it is generally accepted that consciousness comes in degrees. If we use the above as a rough guide, we can be pretty confident mice have at least the first level, since as I said before, they have the brain physiology to experience pain and act as if they feel pain.
I'm exceedingly curious as to where you draw the line between human and mouse. Your rebuttal to my hypothetical societal argument was that we can travel along the evolutionary tree, so that any distinction we may draw is essentially arbitrary. So from whence comes the surplus of moral significance?
The cognitive capacity to experience pain. I have no better guidelines than that, and until we get a good theory of consciousness, exactly what constitutes the capacity to experience pain is fairly subjective. Obviously microbial life doesn’t as they lack any sort of nervous system, and I don’t think insects and other bugs do since they have a very basic nervous system, but some people might think otherwise. So I think you can draw a much less arbitrary line than one that stops at the human species, but it is subjective up to a point just due to a lack of current knowledge.
Rights are something that must be deserved.
Why?
An animal cannot understand the concept of a right. It has no responsibility; it cannot be held accountable for violating the rights of others.
This is irrelevant.
If we give an animal the right not to be injured, how do we react if the animal injures someone?
We would react in such a way that would prevent it from happening again (or reduce the likelihood of it happening), just like we do (or should do) when a human injures someone.
Giving an animal a right is no different from giving a rock a right: neither can understand what a right is. This understanding is precisely what makes the right meaningful - it is the responsibility required of something before we can grant it a right.
Understanding isn’t required for a right. An infant can be protected by human rights without understanding what its rights are, and this doesn’t make the rights of the infant lack some sort of meaning.
I'm saying the latter of your two interpretations. Yes, you've already argued against it. Yes, I've refuted said arguments.
You said: "The opinion of the powerful is not necessarily correct, so this point is moot."
No one said anything about being correct; please reread. This comment leads me to conjecture that you believe in objective truth.
You said: "...we can be pretty confident mice have at least the first level...."
Err...what in the name of Sweet Baby James are you talking about? This is your most absurd claim yet.
You said: "I have no better guidelines than that, and until we get a good theory of consciousness, exactly what constitutes the capacity to experience pain is fairly subjective."
This is a rather elaborate way of saying that the line you've drawn is arbitrary. Ok, I can accept that. Perhaps we should endeavor to lay out a table characterizing your moral consideration as a function of cognitive ability to feel pain. Lizards would go above salamanders, but below moles. No wait, maybe moles would be under lizards? Ah I dunno, we can figure it out later.
We said:
"Rights are something that must be deserved."
"Why?"
What's the point of giving a right to something that doesn't deserve it?
You said: "This is irrelevant."
No; please finish reading the paragraph. I know you're anxious, but please! I beseech you!
You say: "Understanding isn’t required for a right. An infant can be protected by human rights without understanding what its rights are, and this doesn’t make the rights of the infant lack some sort of meaning."
I don't feel that infants deserve rights. Infants do not have any responsibility and are thus not worthy of rights. Society may choose to ascribe them rights, but I feel that said rights are ill conceived.
What are the rights of lions?
Are predators to be segregated from their prey and fed tofu burgers instead?
Turning the planet into a "nerf world" (to steal a title from Dafydd ab Hugh) managed by vegan zookeepers doesn't seem very ecological.
I'm saying the latter of your two interpretations. Yes, you've already argued against it. Yes, I've refuted said arguments.
I must have missed the part where you refuted my arguments.
This is a rather elaborate way of saying that the line you've drawn is arbitrary. Ok, I can accept that. Perhaps we should endeavor to lay out a table characterizing your moral consideration as a function of cognitive ability to feel pain. Lizards would go above salamanders, but below moles. No wait, maybe moles would be under lizards? Ah I dunno, we can figure it out later.
We don’t need an exact taxonomy of where all the different animals fit on a scale of moral importance – I think we already have an intuitive idea that big smart mammals have more importance than small mammals which have more importance than insects.
I don't feel that infants deserve rights. Infants do not have any responsibility and are thus not worthy of rights. Society may choose to ascribe them rights, but I feel that said rights are ill conceived.
Ummm, okay. You’ve given no reason for thinking this, and every sane person disagrees with you.
Kent -
Since presently we have no way of protecting lions and their prey, how about we just let nature do what it will? I am much, much less concerned with animals that live their lives in nature and much, much more concerned about animals being tortured in factory farms unnecessarily.
You said: "I must have missed the part where you refuted my arguments."
Yes, this wouldn't surprise me.
You said: "...I think we already have an intuitive idea that big smart mammals have more importance than small mammals which have more importance than insects."
Well, it's nice that you think that. I happen to disagree; I don't find this to be "intuitive" at all. Your statement is nothing more than a reflection of the arbitrary nature of your morality towards animals.
You said: "You’ve given no reason for thinking this..."
Admittedly, I'm a little incredulous; could you really be serious? This has already been explained. I'll quote myself:
"Infants do not have any responsibility and are thus not worthy of rights."
This was a corollary of my argument regarding the necessity of responsibility of the "right-ee" if rights are to be meaningful.
You concluded with: "...and every sane person disagrees with you."
This is a cute claim; I demand proof. Even if this absurd assertion could be proven, my response would be: "who cares?"
Let me summarize how I see things standing right now:
Your position is the extremist moral relativist position – that is, morals are subjective and thus “good” and “bad” are ascribed to actions by those who have the power to control those actions.
If this were true, this would be no argument against veganism. It would just mean that my subjective moral sense tells me exploiting and torturing animals is wrong, and it would still make sense to express my opinion about being vegan, as it has been shown to change the opinions of others, thus furthering my own moral goals. The claim that animals have no responsibilities and therefore have no rights (a claim you have yet to defend on any grounds other than it being your opinion) is also taken as subjective and thus not a criticism of my view.
However, there are extremely good reasons for thinking the extreme version of the moral relativist position is flat out wrong. Firstly, social animals which exhibit altruistic behaviour are common. This lends a lot of credit to the idea that there is some genetic basis for altruism. The fact that debates about what is “right”, “wrong”, “good” or “bad” happen – and are resolved – is conclusive proof that such common ground exists, at least within a society. Cross-cultural studies reveal that the so-called “Golden Rule” has arisen independently in pretty much every human culture. The near-universality of such rules gives pretty much all people a common ground upon which to talk about morals.
Given that people generally have common ground to talk about morality and ethics, it is perfectly possible for someone to be wrong about the morality of something. This can happen through ignorance (i.e. not knowing what goes on in factory farms), or being inconsistent (i.e. claiming humans are morally relevant because they are more intelligent than animals, while ignoring that some humans are not).
Given that the vast majority of people don’t like to be the cause of suffering, I, as a vegan, see eating meat as morally inconsistent. Now, people can still claim that other things have a higher priority than morality (i.e. they like the taste of meat more than they like being moral), and then no moral case can be made for veganism. However, this does require the person to admit that their morality takes a lower priority than their taste buds (something most people probably wouldn’t admit).
You: "If this were true, this would be no argument against veganism. It would just mean that my subjective moral sense tells me exploiting and torturing animals is wrong, and it would still make sense to express my opinion about being vegan..."
So too then it still makes sense for me to express my opinion that veganism is absurd - which is precisely what I'm doing. Don't confuse the morality < power issue with my opinion on your views(which is discussed both above this post and below within this post).
You: "(a claim you have yet to defend on any grounds other than it being your opinion)"
Again, I fail to see how you could possibly be serious about this. Let's go over it again:
Rights are not something cosmic or objective; they are a human construct. In order that rights be meaningful, it's reasonable that we should not ascribe them to everything we see around us. How then to decide what gets rights? The distinction simply has to be arbitrary at some level, but I personally feel we can do better than your opinion (which to me seems heart-wrenchingly arbitrary). We can do better by realizing that it simply makes good sense to give rights only to those which can understand them. This is where the arbitrary, yet perfectly tenable, line is drawn. Let me elucidate: I claim that if a right is to be meaningful, its holder must be aware of the right. For otherwise, how can the holder of the right understand and be expected to respect the rights of others? With rights should come these responsibilities. Rights are a human notion, understood by intelligent beings, and should be applied as such - to humans or whatever else may understand them. This is the motivation for my opinion; I feel that it is superior to the motivation for your opinion. I'm not sure where you'd like to go from here, but if you continue to simply assert that I have not justified my opinion, then I will be forced to conclude that you are incompetent.
You: The fact that debates about what is “right”, “wrong”, “good” or “bad” happen – and are resolved – is conclusive proof that such common ground exists, at least within a society.
Yes, no one is attempting to dissuade you from the view that your precious common ground exists. I'm simply arguing that the common ground is arbitrary. That most societies have arrived at the same common ground in no way constitutes disproof of my claim.
You don't seem to be trying very hard to understand a very simple fact: those with power decide what is (de facto) right and what is wrong. I'm not asserting that those with power invariably define "right" to be skinning animals alive and mutilating their genitals. If the powerful want to define the golden rule as "right," then so be it. And I agree, it seems that within Western culture, the powerful have done something which is in the ballpark of this.
You: "However, this does require the person to admit that their morality takes a lower priority than their taste buds (something most people probably wouldn’t admit)."
Or how about they admit that their moral compass doesn't align with yours on the matter at hand?
Morality is a human construction; there is nothing objective about it. Stating that some portion of modern society shares common views on certain moral issues is about as relevant as saying that a group of newts all seem to like to eat the same species of flies as of late. Do you know what else certain demographics of modern society like? Romantic comedy films. Read: your discussions of opinion en masse do little else than to demonstrate your missing of the point.
So too then it still makes sense for me to express my opinion that veganism is absurd - which is precisely what I'm doing.
Yes, in which case, if you are right about that, we end in a stalemate in regards to veganism.
I claim that if a right is to be meaningful, its holder must be aware of the right. For otherwise, how can the holder of the right understand and be expected to respect the rights of others?
If we go by the “arbitrary” criterion of reducing suffering, your statements are completely irrelevant (I realize this cuts both ways). There is no reason to only ascribe rights to those who we expect to respect the rights of others – someone isn’t less capable of suffering because they don’t understand something.
I'm simply arguing that the common ground is arbitrary. That most societies have arrived at the same common ground in no way constitutes disproof of my claim.
I am simply arguing that this common ground is the ground upon which talks of morality stand on. When we discuss morality, we draw it back to other things. You can’t argue a moral issue without at some point referring to some moral principle your audience would agree with. It might be arbitrary, but it is what evolution (biological and cultural) has given us. The fact that it exists allows us to have discussions on what is right and wrong. If you don't agree with the common grounds, then we can't have a discussion on what is right and wrong and it is pointless for you to try to convince me that torturing an animal isn't wrong.
[T]hose with power decide what is (de facto) right and what is wrong.
No. Governments decide what is legal and illegal. Individuals decide what is right and wrong. Culture plays on what individuals think, and the powerful can influence culture, but this doesn’t mean those with power decide what is right and wrong. It is not a contradiction to say that someone with power than is wrong about a moral issue.
You: "However, this does require the person to admit that their morality takes a lower priority than their taste buds (something most people probably wouldn’t admit)."
Or how about they admit that their moral compass doesn't align with yours on the matter at hand?
You completely ignored my argument that led up to this. If someone agrees that they don’t want to cause animal suffering, and that eating meat causes animal suffering, then the only way they can justify eating meat is if their morality is lower on their priorities than taste.
Morality is a human construction; there is nothing objective about it.
Which I have agreed with all along. I am not a moral realist.
Stating that some portion of modern society shares common views on certain moral issues is about as relevant as saying that a group of newts all seem to like to eat the same species of flies as of late.
Morality is defined on the grounds that people share, and therefore mass shared opinion obviously matters when it comes to morality. A discussion about morality needs to start with common moral ground, which doesn’t necessarily have to be logical (of course morality is, at its base, an emotional thing). Stating that there is a common ground – which is essential for talking about what is right and wrong – is the most relevant thing I could say.
You: "If we go by the “arbitrary” criterion of reducing suffering, your statements are completely irrelevant (I realize this cuts both ways). There is no reason to only ascribe rights to those who we expect to respect the rights of others – someone isn’t less capable of suffering because they don’t understand something."
I disagree with you, and I've stated why. There's nowhere we can go from here.
You: "It might be arbitrary, but it is what evolution (biological and cultural) has given us."
No, not "might be"...let's try "is definitely" instead.
You: "If you don't agree with the common grounds, then we can't have a discussion on what is right and wrong and it is pointless for you to try to convince me that torturing an animal isn't wrong."
I agree with the statement that much of society seems to share similar views on a lot of moral matters. I don't agree that this renders their views non-arbitrary. This is the only point I am attempting to make with regards to this avenue of our discussion; all of your sub-points are superfluous.
You: "No. Governments decide what is legal and illegal. Individuals decide what is right and wrong."
This is semantics.
You: "It is not a contradiction to say that someone with power than is wrong about a moral issue."
If someone with power decides that you are wrong in saying that they are wrong, then, de facto, you are wrong. Their definition will be mapped into reality - not yours. That they may choose to let your definition be mapped into reality is not falsification of my claim.
You: "If someone agrees that they don’t want to cause animal suffering, and that eating meat causes animal suffering, then the only way they can justify eating meat is if their morality is lower on their priorities than taste."
If this is the point you were trying to make, then sure, I'll give it to you. It's so obvious that it's barely even a point - it's more of a round; perhaps a gentle hump. You are saying that if I admit that dancing a merry jig is morally wrong, the only way I can justify dancing merry jigs is if I admit that the importance I place upon merry jigs surpasses that upon my morals. Ok, wonderful.
You: "Stating that there is a common ground – which is essential for talking about what is right and wrong – is the most relevant thing I could say."
No, the most relevant thing you could say would be to acknowledge the fact that morals are arbitrary. This puts the whole discussion in perspective and reminds us that we're just going to end up having a clash of opinions that is destined to end in stalemate.
If someone with power decides that you are wrong in saying that they are wrong, then, de facto, you are wrong.
I think you are just misusing the term wrong. If someone in power says 1 + 1 = 3, this doesn’t mean they are right, even if they map this claim onto reality. Someone in power is capable of being ignorant of all the morally relevant facts, and is capable of being morally contradictory. In these two cases, they would be morally wrong, and could be called on it, regardless of what results.
No, the most relevant thing you could say would be to acknowledge the fact that morals are arbitrary.
If by arbitrary you mean that they have no objective relevance, then I don’t see:
1. Why you have even bothered to make this point, as I have readily admitted it and have no problem with it
2. Why this matters in the slightest (it is like saying “beauty isn’t an objective property” and then trying to conclude that therefore, there is no point in people talking about beauty based on their common ideas about beauty)
Sorry, I meant to ask this:
You: "No. Governments decide what is legal and illegal. Individuals decide what is right and wrong."
This is semantics.
What do you mean by this? Surely not that what is ethical is the same thing as what is legal. There is a difference between what is legal and what is right (i.e. drinking alcohol while pregnant is legal. Many people believe drinking while pregnant is immoral, but wouldn't want to take away a woman's freedom just because she is pregnant, and thus wouldn't want to make it illegal), and a difference between what is wrong and what is illegal (i.e. people against the legalization of marijuana don't necessarily believe smoking marijuana is immoral - they might just believe that legalizing it would encourage more people to smoke, which supposedly would lead them to try harder drugs. So their stance on the legalization of marijuana might have nothing to do with morality and everything to do with the societal consequences).
So what do you mean?
You: "If someone in power says 1 + 1 = 3, this doesn’t mean they are right, even if they map this claim onto reality."
What does it mean to be "right?" The notion of truth is, like rights and morality, a human construct; there is no objective "truth." If I have sufficient power so as to map my claim "1+1=3" into reality and forcibly make silent all of those who may oppose, then I am right in saying "1+1=3."
With regards to the semantics comment:
Laws and morals are intimately linked. The laws of a given society necessarily tend to reflect its law-makers' definitions of right and wrong. How could they not?
Enforcing these laws is part of the power struggle - part of mapping one particular group's definitions of right and wrong into reality.
The notion of truth is, like rights and morality, a human construct; there is no objective "truth." If I have sufficient power so as to map my claim "1+1=3" into reality and forcibly make silent all of those who may oppose, then I am right in saying "1+1=3."
I think your claim speaks for itself.
With regards to the semantics comment:
Laws and morals are intimately linked. The laws of a given society necessarily tend to reflect its law-makers' definitions of right and wrong. How could they not?
Yes, they do tend to reflect what the makers find right and wrong. This doesn’t change the fact that morality and legality are different.
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